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THE 2006 REVISIONS TO JAPAN’S EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT LAW: A NARROW 
APPROACH TO A PERVASIVE PROBLEM 
Megan L. Starich† 
Abstract: In June 2006, Japan changed its approach to employment 
discrimination by amending the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (“EEOL”).  The 
change was prompted by increased gender discrimination litigation, domestic economic 
pressures relating to the low birth rate, a stagnant economy and declining labor force, and 
criticism from the United Nations. The revised law attempts to address several of the 
shortcomings of the old law.  First, Japan has made the law applicable to all workers 
rather than just to women workers.  Second, the revisions expand the scope of the law by 
including a section on indirect discrimination.  Third, the revisions provide greater 
protection for workers who take childcare and family leave by prohibiting employers 
from effectively denying employees’ rights to child care leave.  
 While these revisions to the EEOL indicate a positive conceptual shift in 
employment discrimination law in Japan, they appear to fall short in three areas.  First, 
the provisions on indirect discrimination are too narrowly drafted. Second, the childcare 
leave provisions fail to place an affirmative duty on employers to act.  Third, the 
enforcement measures are still too weak. To correct these problems, a more general legal 
definition of indirect discrimination should be drafted, regulations should be issued to 
assist employers in providing more accommodating work environments for parents who 
exercise their right to child care leave, and the enforcement provisions of the law should 
be strengthened.   
This comment traces the development of the EEOL in Japan and highlights the 
issues that the old versions of the law did not address.  It then discusses the specific 
changes in the 2006 revisions, their strengths and shortcomings, and recommends certain 
changes.  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Setsuko Honma, a Japanese woman and gender-rights litigant, 
proclaimed the 2006 Revisions to Japan’s Equal Opportunity Employment 
Law “useless.”1  She was not alone in her disappointment.  Honma was one 
of five women who sued her employer, the Kanematsu Corporation, for its 
discriminatory dual-track career system.2  The employees claimed that 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professors Andrew Pardieck and Veronica Taylor for their 
guidance and advice, and the editorial staff of the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal for their tireless 
work and encouragement.  Finally, I would like to thank my husband Kevin for his support and 
understanding throughout this process.  
1
 Akemi Nakamura, Working Women Still Battle Bias, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at ¶ 2, available 
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20060309f1.html. 
2
 The dual-track career system is a practice among many of Japan’s larger employers.  They 
separate their regular, full-time employees into two tracks, a managerial track and a clerical track.  Men are 
predominantly placed on the managerial track and enjoy better pay and better opportunities for 
advancement and promotion. Employers argue the distinction is not made on the basis of gender but on 
other characteristics such as educational background, performance on examinations, ability to work long 
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Kanematsu’s dual-track system kept women in lower paying jobs than their 
male colleagues who were doing the same work.  The Tokyo District Court, 
however, dismissed the suit in November 2003, stating that the two-track 
system does not violate any law or legal principle because it theoretically 
still allows female employees to move into the managerial track.3  
Honma’s disappointment reflects the fact that Japan’s recent revision 
to its employment discrimination law, while a slight improvement, falls far 
short of addressing the larger issues of gender inequality in Japanese 
employment.  Those issues include the pervasive employer practice of 
indirect discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law’s 
(“EEOL”)4 weak enforcement mechanisms, and the inability (or lack of 
‘choice’) of many women to continue working after becoming pregnant.  
These are not simply human rights issues, but are also issues of economic 
productivity; women make up roughly 48% of the workforce in Japan, and 
are often left with little choice but to quit working or accept menial 
employment.5  International pressure from the United Nations6 combined 
with domestic pressure from a slow economy and falling birth rate7 to 
influence Japan’s decision to implement the newest revisions to the EEOL.  
However, the new law remains incomplete.  Specifically, the scope of the 
law’s indirect discrimination provision is too narrow, the childcare 
provisions fail to place an affirmative duty on employers to accommodate 
child-rearing parents, and the enforcement mechanisms remain too limited.   
                                                                                                                              
overtime hours, etc.  Those placed on the clerical track perform duties with less responsibility, are not 
eligible for advancement into management positions and are given less pay and benefits.  A 1990 Ministry 
of Labor survey found that 3.7% of women were on the managerial track as opposed to 99% of men. See 
Galen T. Shimoda, Japan’s New Equal Employment Opportunity Law: Combating Sexual Harassment in 
the Workplace, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 215, 224 (2002).   
3
 See Nakamura, supra note 1, at ¶ 4.   
4
 Kōyō no bunya ni okeru danjyo kintō na kikai oyobi taigū no kakuhotō ni kansuru hōristu [Law on 
Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment], Law No. 
113 of 1972, amended by Law No. 45 of 1985, Law No. 92 of 1997, and Law No. 82 of 2006 [hereinafter 
EEOL].  
5
 Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, White Paper on the Labor Economy, 2005, 
available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/l-economy/2005/dl/02-02-03.pdf, at 1.  
6
 These revisions were partially a response to concerns brought to light in 2003 by the U.N. 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women.  The Committee published a report that 
urged Japan to address indirect discrimination in the workplace, including the dual-track employment 
system and the hiring of predominantly women as non-regular workers.  Nakamura, supra note 1, at ¶ 17. 
7
 Many view Japan’s declining fertility rates and aging population with heightened concern.  It is 
widely reported by the Japanese media that the declining birth rate may result in labor shortages and a large 
number of elderly in need of public support.  This may reduce economic productivity and undermine 
Japan’s position as an economic power on the global stage.  This situation has prompted policy makers to 
encourage better utilization of the female workforce.  See Patricia Boling, Family Policy in Japan, 27 J. 
SOC. POL’Y 173, 175 (1998).   
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This comment discusses the inefficacy of the 2006 revisions to the 
EEOL (“2006 Revision”)8 and recommends further revisions to meet the 
goal it establishes.  Part II outlines the development of gender discrimination 
law in Japan.  Part III summarizes three main aspects of the 2006 Revision: 
provisions addressing indirect discrimination, childcare leave, and legal 
enforcement.  Part IV examines the inadequacies of the 2006 Revision.  Part 
V suggests additional steps that law and policymakers can take to further the 
EEOL’s effectiveness in curbing gender discrimination in the Japanese 
workplace.   
II. JAPAN’S GENDER DISCRIMINATION LAWS HAVE NOT PREVENTED OR 
ELIMINATED GENDER STRATIFICATION IN THE WORKPLACE  
Japan’s anti-discrimination laws have their roots in Article 14 of the 
Japanese Constitution.9 Article 14, however, “does not directly regulate 
conduct between private parties.”10  Subsequent legislative and judicial 
actions have implemented the principle of Article 14 with respect to 
employment discrimination.  These actions include the Labor Standards 
Law,11 the public order doctrine, and the EEOL.  However, these actions 
have been largely ineffective at eliminating gender discrimination in several 
areas of employment, necessitating the 2006 Revision.  This section traces 
the background of gender discrimination law leading up to and through the 
passage of the EEOL.  It also examines two previous versions of the EEOL, 
briefly summarizes their contents, and introduces the issues left unresolved.  
                                           
8
 Kōyō no bunya ni okeru danjyo kintō na kikai oyobi taigū no kakuhotō ni kansuru hōristu oyobi 
rōdō kijun hō no ichibu o kaisei suru hōritsu [Law on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment 
between Men and Women in Employment and Revising a Part of the Labor Standards Law], Law No. 82 of 
2006 [hereinafter 2006 Revision].  
9
 Article 14 states, “All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in 
political, economic, or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.  Kenpō, 
art.14, para.1, translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt, J. Mark Ramseyer & Mark D. West, THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM: CASES, CODES AND COMMENTARY 738 (2006). 
10
 See Sasaki v. Iron and Steel Federation, 156 Zeimu soshō shiryō 2202 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 
1986) translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES AND 
COMMENTARY 587 (2006) (upholding validity of Iron and Steel Federation’s calculation and payment of 
employee wages based on a two-track system).  
11
 Rōdō kijun hō [Labor Standards Law], Law No. 49 of 1947. 
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A. Japan’s Labor Standards Law Prohibits Gender Discrimination Only 
as to Wages  
Passed in 1947,12 the Labor Standards Law13 provides only limited 
protections against gender discrimination.  It mandates equal treatment in 
employment between men and women only with respect to wages.14  An 
employer may not discriminate in wages “by reason of the worker being a 
woman.”15  That is, under the Labor Standards Law, a woman may be paid 
differently for performing the same tasks as a male employee so long as the 
employer can provide some real justification other than the employee’s 
gender or gender stereotypes.16   
The Labor Standards Law’s major shortcoming is that it fails to 
address gender discrimination outside of wage considerations.  The law does 
not prohibit gender-based discrimination with respect to hiring, firing, 
promotion, or any other part of the employment relationship.17  An earlier 
version of the law also ensured differential labor treatment among men and 
women because it barred women from performing holiday work, night work, 
hazardous and noxious work, and mining work.18  Under the Labor 
Standards Law, Japanese employers developed various legal—yet 
discriminatory—employment practices that favored male employees over 
women.19  These included discrimination based on gender in hiring or 
promotion and the requirement that female employees retire upon marriage.  
                                           
12
 The Labor Standards Law is still in effect and was last amended in 2006.  See Ryuichi Yamakawa, 
Labor Law Reform in Japan: A Response to Recent Socio-Economic Changes, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 627, 632 
(2001).   
13
  The Labor Standards Law is the basic statute regulating individual labor relations.  It covers 
employment contracts, payment of wages, working hours, rest days, annual paid leave, protection of 
children and pregnant women, workers compensation, etc.  See id. at 632. 
14
  See id. at 636.   
15
  Kazuo Sugeno, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 161 (Leo Kanowitz trans., Carolina 
Academic Press 2002) (1992). 
16
  Id. at 161-62. 
17
  Id. at 161. 
18
  This has gradually been amended and special protections abolished.  Those that have been 
abolished include special protections for women with regard to overtime work and night work, and more 
recently mining work. Yamakawa, supra note12, at 636.   
19
  Sugeno, supra note 15, at 163.  I am referring here mainly to the dual-track employment structure 
explained above, as well as the growing part-time and non-regular worker population, 90% of whom are 
female.  See Charles Weathers, Temporary Workers, Women and Labour Policy-Making in Japan, 16 
JAPAN FORUM 423, 425 (2004).   
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1. Japanese Courts Have Invoked the Public Order Doctrine to Punish 
Discriminatory Employer Practices 
To remedy the inadequacies of the Labor Standards Law, the courts 
have developed a legal principle based on Article 90 of the Civil Code20 
called the “public order doctrine.”21  Article 90 of the Civil Code nullifies 
any juristic act whose “object . . . is contrary to public policy or good 
morals.”22  The courts have applied this doctrine to enforce the 
Constitutional principle of equality (Article 14) between private individuals.   
Japan’s courts began applying the public order doctrine to gender 
discrimination cases beginning in the 1960s.23  The courts first invalidated 
systems that required women to resign from their employment upon 
marriage.24  The courts also invalidated practices such as mandatory early 
retirement for women (often age 30),25 and requiring women to quit upon 
pregnancy or the birth of a child.26  The courts continue to apply this 
doctrine today.27 
Although the courts have taken an aggressive approach to some areas 
of labor law,28 they have been reluctant to use the public order doctrine to 
invalidate employers’ discriminatory practices with respect to promotion and 
initial hiring.29 The Tokyo District Court articulated the courts’ view, stating 
that while unreasonable sex discrimination in wages and mandatory 
retirement violates public order, “the failure of an employer to grant an equal 
                                           
20
  Minpō, art.90, translated in Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES AND 
COMMENTARY 749 (2006).  
21
 Sugeno, supra note 15, at 163.   
22
  Minpō, art. 90. See also Daniel H. Foote, Judicial Creation of Norms in Japanese Labor Law: 
Activism in the Service of Stability?, 43 UCLA L. REV. 635, 672 (1996).  
23
  See Frank K. Upham, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 130 (1987). 
24
  Id. at 131, citing Suzuki v. Sumitomo Semento K.K., 17-6 Rōminshū 1407 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 20, 
1966) (invalidating Sumitomo Cement’s decision to fire a female employee for her refusal to retire upon 
marriage because this restricted a woman’s freedom to marry and therefore violated Article 90 of the Civil 
Code). 
25
  Id. at 133, citing Tokyū Kikan Kōgyō, 20 Rōshū 715 (Tokyo D. Ct. Jul. 1, 1969) (invalidating 
employer’s mandatory retirement policy for women who reached age 30).   
26
  Id., citing Matsuro v. Mitsui Shipbuilding Corp., 22 Rōshū 1163 (Osaka D. Ct., December 10, 
1971) (invalidating employer’s mandatory retirement policy for women upon marriage or upon the birth of 
her first child).   
27
  Recently, the Osaka District Court ordered Sumitomo Metal Industries to pay 63 million yen to 
four employees who suffered sexual discrimination in wages and promotions, stating that the employer’s 
practices went against public order.  See Sumitomo Kinzoku Kōgyō, (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/search/jhsp0030?action_id=dspDetail&hanreiSrchKbn= 
01&hanreiNo=6578&hanreiKbn =03, discussed  in Sumitomo Metal Guilty of Gender Bias, JAPAN TIMES, 
Mar. 29, 2005, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20050329a3.html. 
28
  For example, the courts have actively developed judicial protections for job security.  See Foote, 
supra note 22, at 683.   
29
  See id. at 672. 
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opportunity in recruitment and hiring [is] not a violation of public order.”30  
The court went on to state that employers have historically been thought to 
enjoy broad freedom of choice in hiring.31  The Tokyo District Court’s 
statements illustrate the general sentiment among Japanese courts with 
respect to hiring and promotion.32   
B. The Original Version of the EEOL Was Inadequate at Eliminating 
Gender Discrimination in Employment 
The United Nations’ International Year of Women in 1975 helped 
convince Japanese lawmakers that gender discrimination is a serious 
violation of human rights.  Consequently, many Japanese politicians and 
bureaucrats began to promote laws and policies against gender 
discrimination.33  In 1980, the Japanese government signed on to the United 
Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”).34  Japan ratified CEDAW in 1985, and 
enacted the first version of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law35 (“Old 
EEOL”) in an attempt to adjust internal law to comply with the U.N. treaty.36  
The Old EEOL formed part of an amendment to thirteen labor laws, 
including the Working Women’s Welfare Law37 and the Labor Standards 
Law.38   
The Old EEOL attempted to discourage gender discrimination in the 
workplace by updating the Labor Standards Law’s sparse provisions on 
                                           
30
  Sasaki v. Iron and Steel Federation, 156 Zeimu soshō shiryō 2202 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 1986), 
translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES AND COMMENTARY 
587 (2006). 
31
  Id. 
32
  See Foote, supra note 22, at 672-73. 
33
  Michiko Aizawa, An International Perspective: A Proposal to Combine Disparate Approaches to 
the Maternal Wall, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 495, 506 (2003). 
34
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 19 I.L.M. 33 
(1980), adopted on Dec. 18, 1979 [hereinafter CEDAW].  See Aizawa, supra note 33, at 506.   
35
  The official title at the time was the “Law to Promote the Welfare of Female Workers by 
Providing for Equality of Opportunity and Treatment in Employment for Women” [Kōyō no bunya ni 
okeru danjo no kintō na kikai oyobi taigū no kakuhotō joshi rōdōsha no fukushi no zōshin ni kansuru 
hōritsu], Law No. 45 of 1985 (passed as an amendment to the Working Women’s Welfare Law [Kinrō fujin 
fukushinhō], Law No. 113 of 1972) [hereinafter Old EEOL].  See also Loraine Parkinson, Japan’s Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 604, 605-06 
(1989).    
36
  M. Christina Luera, Comment: No More Waiting for Revolution: Japan Should Take Positive 
Action to Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 13 
PAC. RIM. L & POL’Y J. 611, 620 (2004).  
37
  Kinrō fujin fukushinhō [Working Women’s Welfare Law], Law No. 113 of 1972, noted in 
Parkinson, supra note 35, at 605-06.   
38
  Parkinson, supra note 35, at 605-06. The EEOL does not replace the Labor Standards Law, but 
only amends it. 
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gender-based wage discrimination.  The Old EEOL articulated five 
employment stages where discrimination was to be discouraged:  
(1) recruitment and hiring; (2) job assignment and promotion; (3) education 
and training; (4) employee benefits; and (5) mandatory retirement age, 
retirement, and dismissal.39  Employers had a “duty to endeavor” to give 
women opportunities equal to men in “recruitment, hiring, assignments, and 
promotion.”40  That is, employers were not prohibited from discriminating, 
but were required to make a good-faith effort to achieve equal opportunity in 
employment.41  Enforcement was left to administrative guidance42 by the 
then-Ministry of Labor and there was no punishment for non-compliance. 
Shortly after its passage, the Old EEOL’s limitations became baldly 
apparent.  The Old EEOL added no prohibitions beyond those already 
established by the courts.43  It only mandated that firms “endeavor” to stop 
discrimination in hiring, placement, and promotion.44  The law was 
essentially toothless.  It did not provide for enforcement by means of a 
private cause of action.45  Instead the law provided three ineffective 
enforcement mechanisms: (1) voluntary resolution through internal 
employer methods; (2) assistance from the Directors of the Ministry of 
Labor Offices of Women’s and Young Workers’ Affairs when employer and 
employee could not resolve matters internally; and (3) non-binding 
mediation by an Equal Opportunity Mediation Commission, but only if both 
parties agreed to the mediation.46  
The business world circumvented the Old EEOL through the two-
track hiring system, which satisfied the requirements of the EEOL but 
maintained the male-dominated company.47  Jobs were divided into two 
tracks: the general, or clerical, track [一般般] and the management track 
[総総般].48  The management track consisted of predominantly male 
                                           
39
  Old EEOL, arts. 7-11, noted in Parkinson, supra note 35, at 606. 
40
  Yamakawa, supra note 12, at 637.  
41
  Id. 
42
  Administrative guidance includes advice, suggestions, recommendations, consultations, and small 
rewards initiated by a government agency to encourage compliance with the law in the private sector.  See 
Tadashi Hanami, Equal Employment Revisited, JAPAN LAB. BULL., Jan. 2000, at ¶ 35. 
43
  Charles Weathers, In Search of Strategic Partners: Japan’s Campaign for Equal Opportunity, 8 
SOC. SCI. JAPAN J. 69, 74 (2005).  
44
  Old EEOL, arts. 7-8, noted in Parkinson, supra note 35, at 606-07.   
45
  Parkinson, supra note 35, at 607.  
46
  Id.  The mediation system proved grossly ineffective, because both sides had to agree to the 
process.  In fact, only one case was ever mediated between 1986 and 1997.  See also Weathers, supra note 
43, at 74.  
47
  Shimoda, supra note 2, at 224.     
48
  Id. 
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employees.49  The clerical track consisted largely of female employees, and 
duties included photocopying, serving tea, and performing basic office 
work.50  Management-track employees were eligible for better pay and 
benefits, and had better access to promotions than clerical-track employees.  
The difference between the two was more than one of economic status; it 
involved different job duties and different commitments from employers to 
provide secure employment and the potential for advancement.  
Employers were able to maintain their discriminatory practices under 
the Old EEOL by setting requirements for the managerial track that kept 
men and women divided.51  These requirements included: a degree from a 
prestigious university, fluency in a foreign language, and additional 
competitive examinations for female applicants.52  Further, management-
track employees were required to work long hours and transfer to locations 
throughout the country.53  This often meant that women, who bore the 
primary responsibility of rearing children, could not realistically comply 
with management track requirements, indirectly weeding them out.54  By 
setting requirements such as these, employers were able to comply with the 
letter of the Old EEOL and maintain the discriminatory dual-track system, 
rendering the Old EEOL ineffective in eliminating gender discrimination in 
employment. 
C. The 1997 Revisions to the EEOL Addressed Gender Discrimination in 
the Japanese Workplace with Limited Success  
Recognizing the defects in the Old EEOL, the Diet revised the EEOL 
in 1997 (“1997 Revision”).55  While this first revision was a step forward for 
gender discrimination law in Japan, it left many problems unresolved.  The 
Diet acted in large part because of social pressures requesting change.  
However, while the 1997 Revision slightly strengthened the law’s 
                                           
49
  The Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare’s (“MHLW”) Equal Opportunity Committee released a 
report that observed that very few women are promoted to the managerial level in companies using dual-
track systems.  See Charles Weathers, Equal Opportunity for Japanese Women, What Progress? (2005), at 
¶ 15, available at http://japanfocus.org/products/details/2012 (citing a MHLW report posted August 3, 
2005).  
50
  Shimoda, supra note 2, at 224. 
51
  Id. 
52
  Id. at 225 (citing Kamio Knapp, Still Office Flowers: Japanese Women Betrayed by the Equal 
Opportunity Employment Law, 18 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 83, 122 (1995) (finding that these requirements 
make it difficult for women to enter the managerial track)). 
53
  Boling, supra note 7, at 181. 
54
  Id. 
55
  Kōyō no bunya ni okeru danjyo kintō na kikai oyobi taigū no kakuhotō ni kansuru hōristu, [Law 
on Securing, Etc. of Equal Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment], Law 
No. 92 of 1997 [hereinafter 1997 Revision].  
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enforcement mechanism, it failed to address the law’s one-sidedness and left 
the issue of indirect discrimination unresolved.  
Fears of a declining birthrate and weakening workforce helped spur 
the 1997 Revision to the Old EEOL.  In 1990, there was an unexpected 
decline in the birthrate (the “1.57 shock”).56  The low birthrate presented the 
potentially serious problem of a decline in the Japanese labor force.  Many 
worried that this decline would create a downturn in economic productivity, 
and shrink the base to support the pension system for a very large elderly 
population.57  In an attempt to address these concerns, the government 
created the Office of Gender Equality in 1994, which consisted of feminist 
activists, academics, and national bureaucrats who studied gender issues.58  
The Office of Gender Equality issued several reports and suggested changes 
to the Old EEOL to resolve the birthrate problem.59  This work laid the 
social and legal framework for revisions to the Old EEOL.60   
After much criticism and heated debate, the Diet revised the Old 
EEOL in June 1997.  This revision61 took effect in April 1999.62  The 1997 
Revision strengthened the Old EEOL in several significant ways.  It changed 
the provision requiring employers to “endeavor” not to discriminate in 
recruitment and hiring, and job assignment and promotion.63  Under the 
1997 Revision, employers were prohibited from discriminating against 
women in hiring and recruiting and job assignment and promotion.64  The 
1997 Revision also recognized sexual harassment for the first time as a form 
of gender discrimination, and placed an affirmative duty on employers to 
prevent sexual harassment in the workplace.65  
                                           
56
  The birthrate in Japan hit a post-war low in 1989 when the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare 
reported that the average number of children a woman would bear in her lifetime was 1.57.   The Japanese 
media reported widely on this statistic, and dubbed it the “1.57 shock.”  This statistic and its corresponding 
media attention re-sparked the gender equality debate, and spurred the Diet to enact the Childcare Leave 
Act of 1991.  See Weathers, supra note 43, at 75.   
57
  See Boling, supra note 7, at 175. 
58
  Weathers, supra note 43, at 75. 
59
  Id. 
60
  Id.  
61
  The new official title of the EEOL was “The Law Respecting the Guarantee of Equal Opportunity 
and Treatment between Men and Women.”  See Sugeno, supra note 15, at 169.   
62
  Shimoda, supra note 2 at 232. 
63
  Id.  
64
  1997 Revision, arts. 5, 6.  
65
  Id. art. 21.  See also Shimoda, supra note 2, at 237.  The EEOL does not explicitly give 
individuals a private cause of action.  The affirmative duty on employers to prevent sexual harassment in 
the workplace was a compliance measure with no penalty attached for non-compliance.  This affirmative 
duty can support a cause of action under tort principles set forth in the Civil Code, but individuals may not 
sue to enforce any rights under the EEOL itself.   
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Importantly, the 1997 Revision changed the enforcement provision by 
granting the employee the right to force her employer into mediation.  The 
Diet charged the Ministry of Health Labor and Welfare (“MHLW”) with 
providing mediation services.66  The 1997 Revision allowed an aggrieved 
employee to request mediation with the Equal Opportunity Mediation 
Commission (“EEOMC”) without the consent of the employer.67  If the 
employer failed to comply with the mediation, the MHLW was given 
authority to release to the media the names of the companies who failed to 
follow the agency’s advice, guidance, and recommendations regarding 
discriminatory practices.68 
Though the 1997 Revision contained a punitive aspect for non-
compliance with EEOMC guidelines, it still did not provide for effective 
enforcement.  Some argued that provision for publication of the names of 
non-complying employers was punitive enough given the Japanese cultural 
preference for group harmony.69  This argument, however, over-emphasizes 
the cultural argument often made by the business lobby, and ignores the 
strong influence of that lobby on the passage of labor legislation.70  Even in 
Japan, where it is probable that employers value their good reputations, this 
measure remains too employer-friendly and is not punitive enough to 
effectuate a change in discriminatory practices.   
Despite its developments, the 1997 Revision left several critical areas 
in need of further revision.  First, the law was written to protect only women 
and did not apply to men.  Second, it did not address the growing problem of 
indirect discrimination.  Indirect discrimination involves employer practices 
or requirements that are facially neutral, but result in disadvantageous 
treatment that affects a group of people disproportionately.71  Third, the 
enforcement provisions remained weak, providing only for administrative 
guidance and the release of a non-complying employer’s identity to the 
media.  These shortfalls prompted the Diet to pass new revisions in 2006.    
                                           
66
  Articles 14-19 provide for the establishment of EEOMCs at each Prefectural Labor Office and the 
appointment of commissioners at each local office to hear arguments from both sides in an employment 
dispute, and to “prepare a proposal for mediation and recommend acceptance to the parties concerned.”  
1997 Revision, arts. 14-19.   
67
  Shimoda, supra note 2, at 233. 
68
  Id. at 232.  This differed significantly from the Old EEOL, which provided that the parties could 
enter mediation proceedings only if both sides consented.  Furthermore, under the Old EEOL, the MHLW 
had no recourse if an employer failed to comply with the mediation or failed to follow the agency’s advice.   
69
  Id. at 236.  
70
  See Carl Weathers, supra note 19, at 426.  
71
  The prevalence of indirect discrimination is apparent when one looks at the percentages of female 
managers in Japan (about 9%), compared to 30% in the UK, and 45% in the US.  See Weathers, supra note 
49, at ¶ 17.  
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III. THE 2006 REVISION MAKES SEVERAL SYMBOLIC CORRECTIONS TO THE 
EEOL, BUT STILL FALLS SHORT IN SEVERAL AREAS 
In 2006, Japan’s Diet made further revisions to the EEOL.  The Diet 
reacted to the rise of gender-discrimination litigation and pressure from the 
United Nations.72  It also made the revisions out of a steady concern for the 
declining birth rate and its effect on the workforce.73  These broad concerns 
prompted the MHLW to convene a new policy deliberation committee 
[審議会] in 2005.  In March of 2006, the Diet approved the MHLW’s 
suggested revisions to the EEOL (“2006 Revision”).  The bill was enacted in 
the 164th Session of the Diet on June 15, 2006.74   
The 2006 Revision makes several significant changes to the EEOL.  
Most notably the revisions address indirect discrimination, adverse treatment 
for taking childcare leave, and provide new enforcement measures for sexual 
harassment.  This section will discuss how the 2006 Revision addresses 
some problems left unanswered in the older versions, and how the 2006 
Revision continues to fall short of the ultimate policy goal espoused in the 
law’s purpose statement. 
A. The 2006 Revision Expands the Applicability of the EEOL 
The 2006 Revision broadens the applicability of the EEOL.  It 
changes the one-sided language of the previous version by making the 
EEOL applicable to female and male employees.  It also adds new forms of 
prohibited employment discrimination, extending the EEOL’s protections.  
These additions are a positive step toward the expansion of the EEOL’s 
applicability and the development of anti-discrimination law in Japan.    
The 2006 Revision represents a symbolic shift in employment 
discrimination law because it changes the one-sided, female-only language 
of the previous version.  The policy deliberation committee’s first 
recommendation for revision was to change the language of the entire EEOL 
so that it would apply to both men and women.75  As such, the 2006 
Revision now reads, “[t]he basic principle of this law is that workers 
                                           
72
  In August, 2003 the United Nations Committee to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) issued a report criticizing Japan’s lagging equal opportunity policies.  Report of the Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 38, U.N. Doc. A/58/38 (2003).  
See also Weathers, supra note 43, at 69.   
73
  Weathers, supra note 43, at 75.  
74
  2006 Revision, Law No. 82 of 2006.  See also Diet Enacts Law to Stem Sex Discrimination at 
Work, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, June 15, 2006, at 1, available at File No. 04:30:20.  
75
  Atsuko Ishii, Kaisei danjo koyō kikai kintō hō no kaisetsu [Commentary on the Revised Equal 
Opportunity Employment Law], NBL, Jul. 15, 2006, at 22, 23.  
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[労働者] be enabled to engage in a full working life without discrimination 
based on sex, with due respect for the maternity of female workers.”76  By 
changing the word “women workers” to “workers,” policymakers were able 
to broaden the scope of the EEOL to cover all forms of gender 
discrimination.  This is a very positive development in Japanese gender 
discrimination law because it changes the concept of the law from one of 
protectionism to one of equality.   
The Diet further expanded the law’s scope by prohibiting additional 
forms of employment discrimination.77  The EEOL bars discrimination in a 
limited set of employment areas.78  The 1997 version prohibited 
discrimination in the areas of recruitment, hiring, job assignment, and 
promotion.79  The 2006 Revision added provisions addressing the employer 
actions of demotion, alteration in employment status, and coercion to make 
an employee to retire or quit.80  The revision further expands the definition 
of the term “job assignment” to include the distribution of tasks and the 
grant of authority.81  When the law goes into effect, employers will be 
prohibited from making decisions on these phases of employment on the 
basis of gender.82  This change comes in response to numerous complaints 
that companies were demoting a disproportionate number of regular women 
workers and relegating them to part-time work.83   
B. The 2006 Revision Recognizes Specific Forms of Indirect 
Discrimination 
With the 2006 Revision, the EEOL recognizes indirect discrimination, 
but only to a limited extent.84  The 2006 Revision narrowly addresses this 
problem by prohibiting three forms of indirect discrimination.  Indirect 
discrimination involves practices that are facially neutral but which in reality 
are “disproportionately disadvantageous”85 to a certain group.  It targets, for 
                                           
76
  2006 Revision, art. 2.   The 1997 version read, “The basic principle of this law is that women 
workers be enabled to engage in a full working life, with due respect for maternity but without 
discrimination based on sex.”  (emphasis mine).  1997 Revision, art. 2. 
77
  See 2006 Revision, art. 6. 
78
  For example, the EEOL prohibits discrimination based on gender in recruitment, hiring, job 
assignment and promotion.  It lists specific areas of employment where discrimination is prohibited, rather 
than prohibiting it more generally to protect all aspects of the employment relationship.    
79
  1997 Revision, arts. 5, 6.  
80
  Id.  
81
  Id. 
82
  See 2006 Revision, art. 6, para. 1-3. 
83
  Ishii, supra note 75, at 26.  
84
  Id. at 25. 
85
  Weathers, supra note 49, at ¶ 8. 
MARCH 2007 JAPAN’S EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYMENT LAW 563 
  
example, employer requirements for managerial track positions that are 
nominally gender-neutral, but effectively exclude most women.  The statute 
attempts to stop employers who discriminate on the basis of sex, but justify 
their actions using legitimate, but false pretenses.86  The Revision gives the 
MHLW authority to adopt ministerial ordinances [省令] that, “take 
appropriately targeted measures,” to shed light on this problem.87  
The MHLW’s proposed ordinances88 articulate three forms of 
prohibited indirect discrimination: (1) using height and weight requirements 
in recruitment and hiring; (2) requiring a managerial track applicant to 
accept a transfer to anywhere in Japan; and (3) requiring candidates for 
promotion to have been previously transferred to other places in their jobs.89  
If the employer cannot prove that these requirements are related to the nature 
of the work or give some other rational reason90 for them, then they are in 
violation of the statute and the practice is prohibited.91  
This provision is a step forward because it gives official recognition to 
a long-standing problem, but lawmakers have only begun to scratch the 
surface.  The EEOL will prohibit certain forms of indirect discrimination, 
and therefore some employees affected by indirectly discriminatory policies 
will have recourse both in the MHLW and in the courts under Article 90 of 
the Civil Code.  However if employee recourse is limited to those situations 
recognized in the ministerial ordinances, the law’s scope is too narrow.   
                                           
86
  2006 Revision, art. 7.  
87
  Id. 
88
 Ministerial orders are directives dealing with matters under an agency’s jurisdiction.  They provide 
technical interpretations of the law and are authoritative sources.  However, legislation passed by the Diet 
has greater legal authority.  See T.J. Pempel, The Bureaucratization of Policymaking in Postwar Japan, 18 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 647, 654 (1974).  
89
 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Kaisei danjyo koyō kikai kintō hō no pointo [Points of the 
Revised Equal Opportunity Employment Law], at 5-6, available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/ 
general/seido/koyou/kaiseidanjo/dl/029-01.pdf 
90
   “Rational reason” [総合合な合理] is not defined in the statute.  Proposed MHLW guidelines state 
that the reason must be concrete [具具合] and judged based on all the circumstances 
[総総合に判断が行わわわわわわわわ].  MHLW policy implementation documents give examples of irrational 
reasons, such as the inability to carry heavy loads due to lack of physical strength.  See, e.g., Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare, Rōdōsha ni taisuru seibetsu o riyū to suru sabetsu no kinshitō ni kansuru kitei 
ni sadameru jikō ni kanshi jigyōnushi ga tekisetsu ni taisho suru tame no shishin [Guidelines for employers 
to appropriately deal with the prohibitions on gender discriminaiton], available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/ 
general/seido/koyou/kaiseidanjo/dl/04a.pdf.  Also, in previous discrimination cases, courts have struck 
down employer explanations such as efficiency in hiring, differences in length of service between male and 
female employees, and that female employees require too many legal protections as “unreasonable” 
[非総合合].  See Sasaki v. Iron and Steel Federation, 156 Zeimu soshō shiryō 2202 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 
1986) translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES AND 
COMMENTARY 587 (2006). 
91
  2006 Revision, art. 7.  
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C. The 2006 Revision Prohibits Adverse Employment Treatment for 
Taking Childcare Leave  
Article 9 of the 2006 Revision provides greater protection for women 
who take maternity or childcare leave.  Although women are entitled to take 
maternity and childcare leave under the Labor Standards Law, many women 
were encouraged to quit their jobs when they became pregnant, or were told 
their jobs had disappeared when they returned to the workplace.92  The 1997 
Revision prohibited employers from terminating employment for getting 
married, becoming pregnant, giving birth, or for taking maternity leave.93  
This proved insufficient to stop the terminations.94  Accordingly, the 2006 
Revision expands the law’s scope by prohibiting employers from “treating 
employees disadvantageously.”95  Specifically, termination during a 
pregnancy or within a year after giving birth, or termination for taking 
childcare leave will be nullified.96  Termination will only stand where the 
employer can prove that the decision was made for a valid reason other than 
pregnancy or taking childcare leave.97   
The MHLW’s proposed ministerial ordinances address the meaning of 
“disadvantageous treatment,” and set out three prohibited reasons for 
termination or disadvantageous treatment.  These prohibitions are similar to 
the ordinances on indirect discrimination.  Under the proposed ordinances, 
an employee cannot be terminated for using or requesting the protection of 
the maternal health provisions of the EEOL98 or for using or requesting 
maternity leave under the Labor Standards Law.99  Moreover, an employer 
cannot terminate an employee under the pretense of inefficiency or inability 
to do manual labor after a female employee has conceived or given birth.100  
                                           
92
  Since the 1997 Revision, the MHLW has heard various complaints from women experiencing 
these problems.  Harumi Ozawa, Japan Tightens Laws Against Sex Discrimination, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, June 15, 2006.   
93
  Ishii, supra note 75, at 26. 
94
  Id.  
95
   [不不不な取取いいいいいないない] 2006 Revision, art. 9, para. 3.  
96
  Id., art. 9, para. 4.  
97
  Id. 
98
  This is an anti-retaliation provision.  Employers may not retaliate by terminating an employee who 
initiates proceedings against her employer for dismissal or disadvantageous treatment because of marriage, 
pregnancy or childbirth.  Id., art. 9.   
99
  Article 65 of the Labor Standards Law requires employers to provide leave to women expected to 
give birth within six weeks and who request it.  It further provides that women may take an additional six to 
eight weeks of leave after the birth, if the woman requests it.  Rōdō kijun hō [Labor Standards Law], Law 
No. 49 of 1947, art. 65. 
100
 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Kaisei danjo kikai kintō hō no pointo [Points on the 
Revised Equal Opportunity Employment Law], available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/ 
koyou/kaiseidanjo/dl/02b.pdf. 
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The proposed ordinances end with the word “nado” (et cetera), indicating 
this is not an exhaustive list.101  Although the ordinances list only three 
prohibited reasons for termination or disadvantageous treatment, the 
inclusion of the word nado may indicate that the MHLW will draft further 
instruction.  Barring the addition of new prohibitions, the word nado may 
support a broader application of the law’s basic concept that employers are 
prohibited from terminating employees who bear children or take parental 
leave.   
The 2006 Revision makes positive inroads to ending indirect, 
disadvantageous treatment towards female employees who take childcare 
leave.  It is hoped that this will encourage employers to take greater steps 
towards retaining expectant parents.  Importantly, this improves upon the 
1997 Revisions because it recognizes that expectant parents face termination 
for their private life choices.  Unfortunately, ambiguity still remains as to 
whether these orders will be strictly interpreted or applied to situations that 
fall outside the three enumerated circumstances listed.   
IV. THE 2006 REVISION FAILS TO FURTHER JAPAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND THE EEOL’S PURPOSES  
Despite the Diet’s efforts, the 2006 Revision satisfies neither the 
constitutional principle of equality under the law, nor the stated purpose of 
the EEOL.  The Constitution states that “[a]ll of the people are equal under 
the law and there shall be no discrimination in political economic or social 
relations because of race, creed sex, social status or family origin.”102  The 
EEOL’s purpose is similarly broad: “The purposes of this Law are to 
promote equal opportunity and treatment between men and women in 
employment in accordance with the principle contained in the Constitution 
of Japan of ensuring equality under the law.”103  Although the 2006 Revision 
represents a more serious attempt to further gender equality in the Japanese 
workplace, it raises several important issues that illustrate a need for further 
revision.  
                                           
101
  Id. 
102
  Kenpō, art.14, para.1, translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: 
CASES, CODES AND COMMENTARY 738 (2006). 
103
  1997 Revision, art. 1, translated by Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law4.pdf (purpose statement not changed in 
2006 Revision).  
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A. The Provisions on Indirect Discrimination Are Too Narrowly Drafted 
The most prominent problem with the 2006 Revision is that it does 
not define indirect discrimination.  The concept of indirect discrimination is 
introduced in the form of three specifically prohibited discriminatory 
measures that are not contained in the body of the statute itself.  The 
legislature essentially passed the buck to the MHLW to draft ordinances 
clarifying the concept.  Drafted by the MHLW, the ordinances prohibit:  
(1) providing for weight and height requirements in hiring and recruitment; 
(2) requiring applicants for promotions to accept transfer to any place in the 
country; and (3) requiring candidates for promotion to have experienced 
transfer to other places.104  This short list is simply insufficient.  
The three recognized forms of indirect discrimination in the 
ordinances are too narrowly drafted.  Although the recognition of these three 
forms will likely “promote equal opportunity and treatment between men 
and women in the workplace,”105 there are certainly countless manifestations 
of indirect discrimination that are not covered by the ordinances.  In fact, 
four other forms of indirect discrimination were discussed in the MHLW 
Labor Policy Council, but not included in the MHLW’s proposals.106   Those 
included (1) requiring a particular academic background or certain degrees 
when it is not necessary for the job; (2) requiring recipients of welfare and 
family benefits to be the registered head of the household; (3) giving 
preferential treatment to regular employees even when there are no 
differences in the work performed by regular and non-regular employees;107 
and (4) excluding non-regular workers from welfare and family benefits 
when there are no differences in work performed.108  The Labor Policy 
Council discussed these particular forms because the MHLW had 
documented these forms of indirect discrimination.109  The inclusion of these 
recognized forms of indirect discrimination in the ordinances on indirect 
discrimination would have made the law more broadly applicable, and thus 
better aligned it with its stated purpose than the enacted version.   
                                           
104
  Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Kaisei danjyo koyō kikai kintō hō no pointo [Points of the 
Revised Equal Opportunity Employment Law], at 5, available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/general/seido/ 
koyou/kaiseidanjo/dl/029-01.pdf 
105
  Id. 
106
 Can Indirect Discrimination be Regulated?, WORKING WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL NETWORK 
NEWS, May 16, 2006, at ¶¶ 12-15, available at http://www.ne.jp/asahi/wwn/wwin/fkintou.htm. 
107
  This places women at a disadvantage because a large percentage of non-regular workers are 
women.  See Weathers, supra note 19, at 425.  
108
  Can Indirect Discrimination be Regulated?, supra note 106, at ¶¶ 12-15. 
109
  Id. at ¶ 5. 
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Because only three forms of indirect discrimination have been 
officially recognized, other equally offensive and unequal practices fall 
outside the law’s remedial scope.  For example, some employers who use the 
dual track system require managerial track employees to graduate from 
prestigious universities.110  This policy indirectly eliminates many women 
from consideration for the managerial track because most graduates from 
prestigious universities are male.111  This real instance of indirect 
discrimination is not covered by the ordinances.  In response to criticism, the 
drafters were careful to include a caveat that the courts may find other forms 
of indirect discrimination than those listed in the statute.   
Japanese case law on discrimination indicates that the courts see the 
EEOL as merely a statement of policy that illustrates the current social 
trends.112  Although the courts in Japan have actively developed the public 
order doctrine to invalidate some discriminatory employer practices, they 
have been reluctant to apply this doctrine to the realm of hiring and 
recruitment,113 where indirect discrimination most likely occurs.  For 
example, in the recently-decided Sumitomo Metal case, the Osaka District 
court found Sumitomo Metal guilty of indirect discrimination in the area of 
wages and promotions.114  The court cited the 1997 version of the EEOL in 
support of its invalidation of Sumitomo’s disproportionate promotion of men 
to the managerial track based on internal personnel rules that were not made 
clear to the employees.115  The court found indirect discrimination in this 
case mostly because Sumitomo’s internal policies were clearly documented 
and discriminatory in the area of promotion, but courts have been unwilling 
to find it in cases where documentation is not as clear, or where the 
discriminatory treatment occurs in hiring or recruitment.116    
Without a more thorough approach from the legislative branch on 
indirect discrimination, courts are likely to continue to apply the doctrine 
sparingly, especially with regard to hiring and recruitment decisions.  This 
                                           
110
  Shimoda, supra note 2, at 224.    
111
  In fact, women accounted for only about 35% of those enrolled at four-year universities in 1998.  
Linda N. Edwards and Margaret K. Pasquale, Women’s Higher Education in Japan: Family Background, 
Economic Factors and the Equal Opportunity Employment Law, 17 J. OF THE JAPANESE AND INT’L 
ECONOMIES 1 (2003) reprinted in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 589 (2006).   
112
  See, e.g., Sasaki v. Iron and Steel Federation, 156 Zeimu soshō shiryō 2202 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 
12, 1986) translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES, CODES AND 
COMMENTARY 587 (2006). 
113
  See Foote, supra note 22, at 672.  
114
 See Sumitomo Kinzoku Kōgyō, (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 28, 2005), available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/search/jhsp0030?action_id=dspDetail&hanreiSrchKbn=01&hanreiNo=6578&hanr
eiKbn=03, discussed in Sumitomo Metal Guilty of Gender Bias, supra note 27.  
115
  Id. 
116
  Foote, supra note 22, at 672. 
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will result in little progress in the promotion of “equal opportunity and 
treatment between men and women in employment”117 in accordance with 
the Constitutional principle that “there shall be no discrimination in political 
economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or 
family origin.”118   
B. The Childcare Leave Provisions Do Not Fully Address the Spectrum 
of Disadvantageous Treatment 
The 2006 Revision stops short of achieving its lofty policy goals by 
failing to address the range of workplace hostility faced by those who take 
childcare leave.  The MHLW has stated that one of the most important 
purposes of the 2006 Revision is to “create an environment in which women 
[can] work and raise children in order to raise the birthrate.”119  The 
childcare leave provisions included in the 2006 Revision fail to fully 
advance this purpose because they contain only negative statements, and 
place no affirmative duty on employers to provide accommodations to 
women who choose to work and raise children.   
Working mothers in Japan often face difficult employment conditions.  
Although statistics show that most eligible women take childcare leave, 
nearly two thirds of women workers quit work when they become pregnant 
(and therefore are not eligible to take their leave).120  Many women often 
quit rather than take childcare leave, because “they are reluctant to force 
extra work on their coworkers during their leave,” and those women who do 
take leave often face resentment among their coworkers who must cover in 
their absence.121  The Nihon Keizai Shinbun122 reports that employers tend to 
parse out the extra work to the other female employees rather than males, 
resulting in still more problems with inequality in the workplace.123  
Working mothers report that this creates strained human relations 
[人間関係] including subtle snubs, put-downs and other hostile actions.124  
                                           
117
  1997 Revision, art. 1, translated by Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, available at 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law4.pdf (purpose statement not changed in 
2006 Revision). 
118
  Kenpō, art.14, para.1, translated in Curtis J. Milhaupt et al., THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: 
CASES, CODES AND COMMENTARY, 738 (2006). 
119
  Weathers, supra note 43, at 77 (citing Rōdōshō Josei Kyoku 2000: 116).  
120
  Weathers, supra note 49, ¶19. 
121
  Id. 
122
  This is a prominent economic newspaper in Japan.  
123
  Weathers, supra note 49, ¶19 (citing NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, May 9, 2005). 
124
  Boling, supra note 7, at 185. 
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This stigma prevents many from taking their parental leave.125  Preventing 
this type of harassment is critical for achieving equality in the workplace. 
The 2006 Revision makes an attempt to curb adverse treatment by 
employers, but falls short of addressing adverse treatment by other 
employees. The 2006 Revision does not place an affirmative duty on 
employers to accommodate childcare leave recipients.  The language of the 
2006 Revision limits the law’s applicability to three types of prohibited 
employer conduct.126  The Revision does not remedy the behavior of 
employers who fail to balance the workload more effectively in the event of 
an absent employee.  Nor does it provide guidance for more flexible work 
arrangements to accommodate the changing demands on the parent-
employee and the remaining employees.  A clearly-stated measure 
addressing this problem would help to further the law’s basic principle and 
allow all workers to engage in a “full working life.”127   
The 2006 Revision does not provide the courts with effective tools to 
stop workplace hostility.  The courts will not likely be willing to apply the 
public order doctrine to such a subtle form of discrimination, because they 
have only done so when discrimination was a documented and obviously 
unreasonable employer policy.128  Courts that have addressed discrimination 
issues related to maternity leave, marriage, and employment have done so in 
the context of mandatory retirement policies within companies, which 
required female employees to agree to retire upon marriage or the attainment 
of a certain age (around thirty).129  The courts reasoned that the preservation 
of the freedom of marriage is part of the public order, and a retirement plan 
that unreasonably restricts the freedom to marry is void as against the public 
                                           
125
  Id. 
126
  Those are: termination for using or requesting the protection of the maternal health provisions of 
the EEOL, requesting maternal health protection under the Labor Standards Law, and termination under the 
pretense of inefficiency or inability of a female employee to do manual labor after a female employee has 
conceived or given birth.  See supra Part III.C, n. 98-99.   
127
  1997 Revision, art. 2, para. 1, translated by Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, 
http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/documents/llj_law4.pdf (This language of Article 2 not 
changed in 2006 Revision). 
128
  See Nomura Shōken, (Tokyo D. Ct., Feb. 20, 2002) at 9-10 available at http://www.courts.go.jp/ 
hanrei/pdf/4EB2213F343683DB49256DD60029DC74.pdf (holding Nomura Securities’ documented, 
automatic promotion system for only managerial track employees illegal as of April 1, 1999 when the 1997 
Revision took effect); Sumitomo Denki Kōgyō, (Osaka D. Ct., Jul. 31, 2000), at 12, available at 
http://www.courts.go.jp/hanrei/pdf/A1BEDCB01C29EF8149256DD60029DC39.pdf (holding Sumitomo 
Electric’s dual-track job assignment practices justified as “right of management” [経経経]). 
129
  See e.g. Upham, supra note 23, at 133 (citing Tokyū Kikan Kōgyō, 20 Rōshū 715 (Tokyo D. Ct. 
Jul. 1, 1969) (invalidating employer’s mandatory retirement policy for women who reached age 30)).   
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order principle of Article 90 of the Civil Code.130  Whereas the retirement 
plan was obviously discriminatory, the more subtle instances of 
discriminatory practices involving unaccommodating work environments or 
coworker resentment will be harder for a court to manage.  Hostile work 
environment is difficult to prove and it would force a court to go out on a 
limb to apply the public order doctrine in such a case.  Thus, it is unlikely 
that the courts will make up for the narrow scope of legislation.     
C. The Enforcement Mechanisms in the 2006 Revision Are Still Too Weak  
The EEOL’s enforcement mechanisms remain effectively toothless, 
too weak to align the law with its stated purpose.  The drafters of the 2006 
Revision did little to alter the existing remedies for employees.  Every stage 
of the EEOL’s drafting and revision has been met with criticism of this 
aspect.  Many Western scholars criticize the EEOL, because it gives no 
incentive to companies to follow the law.131  Some have suggested more 
punitive measures, including heavy fines or criminal sanctions for 
companies that demonstrate patterns of sex discrimination.132   
The EEOL differs significantly from its American counterpart in Title 
VII133 in this manner, and perhaps more punitive enforcement measures 
would increase its effectiveness.134  However, punitive sanctions may not fit 
Japan’s cultural and legal climate.   
Japanese scholars reject America’s litigious approach to gender 
discrimination, arguing that it contradicts Japan’s cultural environment that 
encourages harmony and consensus.135  They stress that American 
jurisprudence teaches legal principles though deterrence, punishment, and 
exorbitant damage awards, while the Japanese approach encourages personal 
contact and negotiation.136  The cultural argument for harmony and 
consensus, however, has long been questioned by scholars, such as John 
Haley, who argue that the low incidence of litigation in Japan results from 
other factors such as institutional incapacity and scarcity of lawyers and 
                                           
130
  Id. at 133-134 (citing Matsuro v. Mitsui Shipbuilding Corp., 22 Rōshū 1163 (Osaka D. Ct., 
December 10, 1971) (invalidating employer mandatory retirement policy for women upon marriage or 
upon the birth of the first child)).   
131
  Jennifer Fan, From Office Ladies to Women Warriors? The Effect of the EEOL on Japanese 
Women, 10 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 137 (1999).  
132
  Id.  
133
  42 U.S.C. §§2000e (2006). 
134
  Fan, supra note 131, at 137. 
135
  See Shimoda, supra note 2, at 247. 
136
  Id.  
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judges.137  As more scholars recognize other structural factors that contribute 
to the low rate of litigation in Japan, the cultural argument becomes less 
persuasive. 
Accepting that Japan is not suited to full litigation of workplace 
discrimination, mediation by the MHLW’s Equal Employment Opportunity 
Mediation Commission (“EEOMC”) is equally insufficient to deter 
discriminatory behavior or comply with constitutional principles.  Although 
the administrative procedure likely resolves some disputes in an efficient 
and cost-effective manner, the EEOMC’s role is that of a mediator, meaning 
its officials assist the parties in reaching a settlement.138  The EEOMC’s 
effectiveness depends largely on voluntary compliance.139  EEOMC officials 
do not make judgments, and the proceedings are not binding on the 
parties.140   Failure to comply, however, may result in a public announcement 
to the media that the employer has violated the EEOL.  This may encourage 
some employers to comply, although there is no measurable loss for failure 
to do so.  The EEOMC’s reliance on voluntary compliance and the relatively 
weak punishment employers receive for non-compliance does not deter 
discriminatory behavior.   
The threat of a lawsuit is not necessarily a serious concern for an 
employer.  Though it is possible that an employer’s failure to attend and 
comply with EEOMC proceedings will prompt the employee to file a lawsuit 
in the courts, discrimination is difficult to prove in the courts and the trial 
process is often very lengthy and costly.141  These factors may discourage 
potential litigants, removing the threat to employers of potential lawsuits.142  
The low probability of discrimination lawsuits also undermines attempts to 
deter discriminatory behavior.   
Several statistics further illustrate that that the EEOL’s enforcement 
provisions are not effectively enforcing the principles the law sets forth.  
Gender stratification continues to worsen in the employment sector.  As of 
2005, the female-male wage differential in Japan was around 66%, and only 
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  John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978).  
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  EEOMCs are located in each Prefectural Labor Office.  They are staffed with commissioners “of 
learning and experience” appointed by the Minister of Health Labor and Welfare.  Aggrieved employees 
may seek informal advice from local offices or file formal complaints.  The EEOMC may initiate mediation 
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  See 2006 Revision, arts. 14-19. 
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8.9% of managers were female.143  Although most large firms have adopted 
the MHLW’s guidelines on discrimination and sexual harassment to protect 
their images,144 the above statistics continue to reflect that the role of this 
law in influencing employment practices is negligible.  Gender 
discrimination continues to be a pervasive problem twenty years after the 
first passage of the EEOL and its enforcement mechanism is still 
insufficient, even after this latest revision.   
V. REVISION IS NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY 
ESPOUSED IN THE EEOL’S PURPOSE AND THE CONSTITUTION 
To align the 2006 version of the EEOL with its stated purpose and the 
Constitution, the Diet should enact further revisions. First, the law should 
include a broader definition of indirect discrimination.  Second, the law 
should place an affirmative duty on employers to provide better childcare 
leave accommodations.  Finally, drafters should aim to strengthen the 
EEOL’s enforcement mechanism through either a grant of binding authority 
for administrative mediation proceedings, or through a cause of action for 
private litigants.   
A. Lawmakers Must Draft a General Legal Definition of Indirect 
Discrimination to Cover a Broader Range of Discrimination 
The 2006 Revisions fail to provide adequate remedial coverage of 
indirect discrimination.  Indirect discrimination remains difficult to solve 
because members of the Labor Policy Council claim they are unsure how 
exactly to define it.145  This issue is complex, because it involves deeply 
rooted practices of dividing labor along gender boundaries.  While the Diet’s 
recognition of this issue reflects a step towards the development of this new 
doctrine, the EEOL’s limited and gradual approach does not fully address the 
possible instances of indirect discrimination.   
Lawmakers should draft a general legal definition of indirect 
discrimination that the courts and administrative bodies can apply.  The Diet 
should make this general legal definition part of the statute itself to send a 
clear, authoritative message to the courts that the concept is to be applied 
more broadly.  This would merely require drafters to revisit the definition of 
the term used in the discussions of the Labor Policy Council’s Subcommittee 
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on Equal Employment.146  The Subcommittee defined indirect discrimination 
as “when rules, standards[,] and customs appear facially to be gender neutral 
but one sex is receiving substantially disadvantageous treatment, and that 
treatment has no relationship to job duties and no legal or rational basis.”147  
Although this definition would need refinement for placement in the statute, 
it is evidence that the term is definable and that the lawmakers have defined 
the term for purposes of their debates. 
U.S. anti-discrimination laws can also serve as an example, though 
not a substitute.  The U.S. Congress codified indirect discrimination in Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.148  The United States takes a broader 
and more litigious approach than the EEOL.  However, Title VII places a 
difficult burden of proof on the complainant and does not open the doors 
widely to successful litigation.149  The disparate impact150 provision states: 
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate 
impact is established under this subchapter only if— 
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and 
the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice 
is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity.151   
The U.S. model demonstrates that indirect discrimination can in fact be 
statutorily defined in a broad manner.  The U.S. Supreme Court has applied 
this statute in cases where plaintiff-employees claim that requirements or 
conditions of employment disqualify a certain group at a substantially higher 
rate than others.152  This portion of Title VII places the initial burden on the 
complainant to prove that the employer’s practice causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.153  If the plaintiff 
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can satisfy this burden, then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to 
show that the practice is “job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”154  If the defendant satisfies this burden, 
then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that “an alternative 
employment practice” exists with a smaller disparate impact.155   
Because of the incongruity of the Japanese and American legal 
systems, the U.S. statutory model would not likely translate easily into 
Japanese law.  Moreover, the U.S. model is not ideal because it is a formula 
for private litigation, and places a very difficult burden on plaintiffs to 
actually prove that a particular employment practice causes a disparate 
impact.156  The U.S. model is, however, a useful starting point in defining 
indirect discrimination by statute to include a broad range of circumstances.   
An effective definition for the EEOL might require a more holistic 
view of indirect discrimination.  The EEOL should establish that indirect 
discrimination exists where the net effect of the employer’s requirements 
(and not one requirement in particular) is that a disproportionately small 
amount of female (or minority) employees are hired for certain positions 
compared to their counterparts in the wider labor market.157  It is difficult to 
avoid statistic-based analyses in indirect discrimination cases because proof 
of an employer’s intent to discriminate is often lacking.  However, the 
statistical approach is particularly compatible with the Japanese preference 
for enforcement by administrative agencies.  A revised EEOL could allow 
the MHLW to collect and analyze such statistical data if it suspects 
discriminatory practices.  The burden of proof in this proposed revision is 
also substantially lower than the U.S. version, because the claimant would 
only be required to show the net effect of the employer’s practices, and not 
base the argument on one specific practice.158 
In short, the 2006 Revision’s statutory scheme for indirect 
discrimination is too narrowly drafted.  While Japanese lawmakers argue 
that the concept is difficult to define in a broad manner, the United States 
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provides an example of a broader definition of the concept.  Several changes 
to the U.S. definition, including a relaxed burden of proof and the collection 
and analysis of statistical data by the MHLW make this approach more 
compatible with the Japanese legal framework, and significantly broaden the 
provisions enacted in the 2006 Revision.   
B. The MHLW Should Adopt Regulations That Place an Affirmative Duty 
on Employers to Act and Assist Employers in Providing Better 
Accommodations for Parents Who Take Childcare Leave 
The MHLW should supplement the childcare leave provisions by 
placing an affirmative duty on employers to provide accommodation for all 
employees.  Although the 2006 Revision recognizes new forms of prohibited 
employer conduct, it does little to address the problem that women often 
choose to quit when they become pregnant.159  Official government policy 
states that the EEOL’s goal is to encourage more women to stay in the 
workforce, and combat the M-curve phenomenon.160  Accepting this policy, 
the government needs to place an affirmative duty on employers to create 
systems that encourage women to remain in the workforce when they 
become pregnant, and retain women even after they have children.   
Supplementary regulation should state that employers have an 
affirmative duty to accommodate employees who take childcare leave.  
Accommodations should include distributing the absent employee’s work 
evenly among remaining employees, making telecommuting options 
available, hiring temporary replacements to take the burden off of remaining 
employees, and allowing leave recipients more flexible work schedules.  
Further, if an expectant parent does decide to quit entirely, employers should 
be encouraged to rehire him or her and provide continuing education to 
better integrate the parent back into the regular work force.   
C. The EEOL Needs a Stronger Enforcement Mechanism 
The administrative guidance model of the EEOL has been ineffective 
at curbing widespread gender discrimination and is virtually toothless.  
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Because Japanese scholars and policymakers are wary of encouraging 
litigiousness, government policies tend to remove disputes from the courts 
and place them into the “government-controlled mediation machinery.” 161  
Legislation, especially in the economic realm, tends to be general and leaves 
broad discretion with bureaucrats to interpret and apply the law.162  
Government officials offer administrative guidance, and compliance is 
theoretically voluntary.163   
As an effective enforcement measure, the EEOMC should become an 
arbitration body, which renders binding decisions.  In the context of the 
Japanese legal system, it may not be feasible to implement civil rights 
legislation identical to that of the United States, as the two countries have 
entirely different approaches to litigation and the enforcement of laws.  The 
arbitration approach need not change the conciliatory focus that the Japanese 
administrative and judicial branches often take.  The arbitrator may still 
encourage conciliation and settlement, but proceedings must be mandatory 
and settlements must be binding.  Non-compliance with the guidelines and 
the decisions of the EEOMC should be more strictly enforced in the form of 
substantial administrative fines or other punitive measures.   
In light of recent legal reforms in Japan, it is increasingly acceptable 
for the government to provide private litigants with a cause of action to 
enforce the EEOL.  Indeed, the Diet has recognized private causes of action 
for investors in securities with the Financial Services Law.164  Hence, there is 
some evidence of the shifting conceptions of enforcement through private 
litigation and of the role of law in society.   
Despite these recent developments, a provision that gives individuals 
a private cause of action to enforce the EEOL would likely encounter many 
obstacles.  First, Japanese lawmakers tend to prefer the administrative 
guidance mechanisms of the bureaucracy to settle disputes.  Second, the 
lawmakers would likely never ratify such a provision.  Labor policy-making 
decisions are made by the Labor Policy Council.  Business, agricultural, and 
other private interest groups are well represented in the Labor Policy 
Council and maintain a controlling influence.  Although unions and women’s 
groups are also represented, their influence is limited.165  Because a private 
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cause of action for individual litigants would represent a major, pro-
employee change to the EEOL, the Labor Policy Council would not greet it 
positively.  This kind of change could only really come about from pressure 
outside the Labor Policy Council, perhaps from more lawsuits by women’s 
activist groups on behalf of victims of discrimination.166  Similarly, it could 
happen if courts further invalidate discriminatory employer practices 
through the public order doctrine.  
In light of these concerns, the most feasible approach to strengthening 
the enforcement mechanisms of the EEOL would be to transform the 
EEOMC into an arbitration body whose authority is binding.  This measure 
maintains the Japanese conciliatory approach and the role of administrative 
guidance while strengthening the power of the executive branch to enforce 
anti-discrimination law.   
VI. CONCLUSION 
In order for Japanese lawmakers to more effectively align the EEOL 
with its purpose and Japan’s constitutional principles, they must continue to 
develop anti-discrimination law and take a more aggressive approach to its 
application and enforcement.  Women make up roughly 48% of the work 
force in Japan167 and their equal participation in the workplace is as much an 
issue of human rights as it is of economic productivity.  Yet, given the 
narrowness of the 2006 Revisions, it remains to be seen whether employers 
in Japan will be more receptive to hiring and retaining female employees.  It 
appears quite likely that employers will still be able to sidestep the law and 
develop new discriminatory practices that the current revisions do not 
address.   
Frank Upham argued in 1987 that the force of the women’s movement 
in Japan might disappear with laws like the EEOL, since the EEOL 
effectively took the anti-discrimination movement out of the courts and 
channeled disputes into the administrative bureaucracy.  After 20 years, 
including several important court cases and two revisions, it is clear that the 
campaign for gender equality has not disappeared.  Due in part to the 
declining birth rate, the issue has become central to Japan’s economic and 
public policy.  While the current Revision attempts to remedy gender-based 
discrimination, it falls short of its goal.  Accordingly, lawmakers should no 
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longer take the path of least resistance.  They should follow up on their 
promise to better promote equal opportunity and treatment between men and 
women in accordance with constitutional principles.  They can do so by 
drafting a general definition of indirect discrimination, regulations 
strengthening childcare leave provisions, and a more punitive enforcement 
mechanism into the EEOL.  These revisions would certainly prove useful to 
victims of discrimination like Ms. Honma.  They would give more substance 
and stronger teeth to what is currently no more than a paper tiger.168 
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